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Dispute Settlement Under the CFTA and
NAFTA: From Eleventh-Hour
Innovation to Accepted Institution
By HLRRY B. ENDsLEY*
L

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The question of dispute resolution in international agreements
has in recent years advanced to the forefront of concern for governments, businesses, and international organizations. The heightened
sensitivity of this issue has been due in large part to dissatisfaction (in
some quarters) with the record of dispute resolution in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT),' with the enhanced role of
regional or plurilateral trade agreements in the world economy, and
with international trade's ever-expanding dimension in the national
economies of the major trading nations.
In drafting the latest and clearly one of the most important regional trade agreements, the negotiators of the North American Free
Trade Agreement2 were sensitive to the need to build on the successful precedent of the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the
United States (CFrA) 3 and to further enhance the perception that the
CFTA's novel dispute settlement mechanisms had largely accomplished their goals of settling disputes in a fair and effective manner,
* Harry B. Endsley of Harry B. Endsley & Associates practices law in San Francisco.

He has been a CFTA/NAFTA dispute panelist since 1989 and was recently nominated by
the United States Trade Representative to the roster of dispute panelists under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva. Mr. Endsley is a past chairman of the International Law Section of the State Bar of California and a member of the Board of Directors
of two arbitration institutes.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTI]. In an address given on September 16, 1993, Director-

General Peter Sutherland of the GATI noted that there were 85 regional trade arrangements in existence, 28 of which existed at the beginning of 1992. GATr Press Release No.
1596, Sept. 16, 1993.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 8, 11, 14, and 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 and 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 LLM. 281 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter CFA].
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eliminating political biases from the process, and reinforcing the rule
of law in international trade.4
The negotiators recognized that not only was the dispute settlement system established by the CFTA generally successful in achieving these goals' it was a system that was sufficiently well conceived
that it could be expanded to cover not only the United States and
Canada, two common-law, economically advanced nations, but also
Mexico, a civil-law, developing nation. Moreover, it was also judged
capable of extending the frontiers of dispute resolution by covering
many of the new or nontraditional subjects of international trade law
such as financial services, environmental measures, health and safety
standards, foreign investment, and intellectual property. In these respects, however, NAFITA's dispute settlement system will clearly be
presented with challenges and opportunities for growth not contained
in the CFTA. Whether the challenges can be overcome and the opportunities seized will depend on the effectiveness of ifhe institutions
4. Arlene Wilson, The Canada-U.S.Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for the NAFTA,
Congressional Research Service, Rep. No. 93-153 E (1993).
5. The dispute settlement mechanism adopted in the CFTA was critical to the very
existence of that agreement and, as a consequence, to the continued use of that mechanism
in NAFTA. The CFTA negotiations were in their eleventh-hour and facing total collapse
when the U.S. negotiators brought forward the concept of having independent binational
panels review antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) determinations of U.S.
and Canadian trade agencies. This proposal was largely designed to postpone the pending
substantive disagreements between the Canadian and U.S. negotiators and to prevent the
collapse of the negotiations. The U.S. goal in the negotiations had been to obtain some
control over Canadian subsidies; the Canadian goal had been to obtain preferential treatment under U.S. AD and CVD law. The negotiators essentially ran out of time to achieve
these goals, Canada being unwilling to relinquish its subsidies, and the United States being
unwilling to derogate from its AD/CVD laws in the absence of an agreement by Canada to
do so, which could not be reached prior to the negotiation deadline. In what was conceived as a temporary solution, the negotiators agreed to put off their substantive disagreements and immediately institute a proceduralmechanism to resolve trade disputes between
the two countries, which would remain in force until the resolution of the substantive issues. This procedural mechanism was a binational panel review. This system was sufficiently attractive to both sides that it was able to salvage the negotiations. For the United
States, it preserved existing AD/CVD laws and established a form of review that applied
the same standards of judicial review as applied by U.S. courts. Moreover, it required
Canada to submit certain types of agency decisions to panel review that previously had not
been subject to appeal in Canada. From the Canadian perspective, Canadian exporters
obtained assurances of a speedy review of U.S. agency determinations and avoided review
by the U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, courts which the Canadians perceived as overly deferential to U.S. agency
determinations.
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created by NAFTA and the efforts of the public and private sectors in
6
all three NAFTA parties.
As suggested above, to a great extent NAFTA's dispute settlement system is modeled directly upon the provisions in the CFTA,
building upon the now well-accepted provisions of that agreement.
However, the NAFTA provisions are more comprehensive than those
of the CFTA and should operate more effectively to help NAFTA
parties prevent and resolve disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of NAFTA, the specific unfair trade practices of dumping
and subsidization, and cross-border investment.7
NAFTA contains three primary mechanisms for the resolution of
disputes, including:
Chapter 20 - Resolution of general
disputes concerning NAFrA's
8
interpretation and application,
Chapter 11 - Resolution of disputes between a party and an investor
of another party,9
Chapter 19 - Resolution of disputes arising under each party's antidumping or subsidy laws.10
A.

Chapter 20

The mechanisms found in chapters 19 and 11 are narrowly defined and deal with precisely drawn subject matters. However, the
chapter 20 mechanism-the general dispute resolution mechanism for
6. The operation of NAFTA's dispute settlement system, currently serving the inter-

ests of three governments, may be expanded to cover other countries as well under

NAFrA's accession clause. NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 22, art. 2204. Any new accessions
will add to the complexities of, and pressures upon, NAFTA's dispute settlement
mechanisms.
7. The NAFTA negotiators were also well tuned to the important developments taking place simultaneously with their own in Geneva under the rubric of the Uruguay
Round. These efforts led to the adoption of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15,1993, GAIT Doc. MTN/FA III.G.72,33 .L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Uruguay Round Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993, GAIT Doc. MTNIFA
I.G.7.6, 33 I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter DSU]. These multilateral agreements, governing
all WTO members, came into force on January 1, 1995. In order to permit the reader a
separate perspective on the subject matter of this article, a tabular comparison of the general dispute settlement mechanism of NAFTA (chapter 20) and of the WTO appears as an
appendix hereto.
8. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 20.
9. Id. ch. 11.
10. Id. ch. 19.
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NAFTA-claims a much broader reach.11 Designed to address all
general disputes that may arise, it must necessarily deal with the
agreement's "new issues," such as enforcement of intellectual property rights,' 2 financial services,'13 standards-related measures, 14 and
environmental measures. 15
Moreover, chapter 20 may deal with issues that do not even involve a breach of NAFTA. Pursuant to article 2004 of NAFTA, the
chapter 20 dispute resolution mechanism must address:
the avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement or wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of
another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of this
Agreement or cause nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004.16
17
Thus, with the exception particularly of chapter 19 disputes,
chapter 20 is intended to cover all disputes regarding (a) the interpretation or application of NAFTA, (b) the domestic measures of a party
that are or might be inconsistent with the agreement, and (c) the domestic measures of a party that might cause "nullification or impairment" of certain benefits arising under the agreement. 18 The latter
phrase-nullification or impairment of benefits-is accepted GAIT
terminology and under annex 2004 may be applied, with certain exceptions, to deny benefits that a party might reasonably expect to
11. Chapter 19 of NAFTA is the direct successor of chapter 19 of the CFTA, with only
minor change. Chapter 20 of the NAFTA represents a substantial redrawing of the
CFTA's chapter 18. Chapter 11 of the NAFTA had no counterpart in the CFTA.
12. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 17.
13. Id. ch. 14.
14. Id. ch. 9.
15. I& ch. 7.
16. Id. ch. 20, art. 2004.
17. Article 2004 excepts from coverage under chapter 20 matters covered in chapter 19
and matters "otherwise provided" for in NAFTA. Id. Such other matters would include
the chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism for investment disputes and the provisions of
chapter 5. The latter provide for review and appeal of origin determinations and advance
rulings by customs officials to at least one level of administrative officials above the customs official making the initial ruling or determination, followed by judicial or quasi-judicial review under the domestic law of the importing party. Another exception would be
that contemplated by article 804, which provides that "[n]o Party may request the establishment of an arbitral panel under Article 2008... regarding any proposed emergency
[safeguard] action." Id. ch. 8, art. 804. Finally, it is expected that the bid challenge mechanism in government procurement matters (chapter 10) will operate indeoendently from the
chapter 20 system.
18. 1d ch. 20.
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arise under selected provisions of NAFTA, even in the absence of a
clear violation of the agreement 1 9
As a cooperative, rule-based regime, NAFTA's chapter 20 mechanism clearly emphasizes the prevention of disputes in the first instance or their cooperative resolution through consultations. In the
event that such consultations are unavailing, however, member governments are able to employ impartial, independent panels to assist in
dispute resolution under the agreement.
As will be discussed more extensively below, the framework of a
chapter 20 dispute involves the following:
" consultations, either at the staff or Free Trade Commission level,
" referral of the dispute to a panel of independent experts,
* dissemination of the panel findings and recommendations, and
" resolution of the dispute by the complaining party.
Overall, chapter 20 of NAFTA will be seen as an improvement
upon the CFTA's general dispute resolution mechanism by modifying
the panel selection process, by extending its coverage to financial services issues, and by specifying special procedures for the resolution of
environmental, health, and safety disputes.
B.

Chapter 11

Uniquely, in its chapter 11 provisions, NAFTA has created a system of arbitration for resolving investment disputes between foreign
investors and host governments.20 The chapter 11 dispute settlement
mechanism provides for consultations and binding arbitration to settle
disputes between private foreign investors and host governments, a
subject matter which has not traditionally been dealt with in trade
agreements.
C. Chapter19
Finally, chapter 19 of NAFTA addresses disputes over antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) determinations by federal
government authorities in the three countries. 2 ' Each NAFTA coun19. Id ch. 20, annex 2004. These provisions include part two of NAFTA (Trade in
Goods), except for the provisions of annex 300-A (Automotive Sector) or chapter six (Energy) relating to investment; part three (Technical Barriers to Trade); chapter twelve
(Cross-Border Trade in Services); or part six (Intellectual Property). See generally ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Violation Complaintsand Non-violation Complaintsin Public International Trade Laws, GERmAN Y.B. INT'L L., 1991, at 175-229.

20. NAFMA, supra note 2, ch. 11.
21. Id. ch. 19.
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try has laws governing certain unfair foreign trade practices, Prior
to the adoption of the CFTA, Canada had argued that these unfair
trade laws were not always applied uniformly. Since both dumping
and subsidy cases are politically sensitive, the charge was that both the
administering agency and even the courts were subject to political
pressures. To reduce the frictions involved in these cases, and to enhance public perception of a fair and balanced trade system, the
CFTA established binational panel review of AD and CVD cases as a
temporary procedural solution, while the United States and Canada
acted separately to negotiate new substantive rules on dumping and
subsidies.
Under chapter 19 of the CFTA, and now under chapter 19 of
NAFrA as well, binational panels of judges and trade experts are established to review a member government's administrative decision
following an investigation of an unfair foreign trade practicep Strict
time limits and various due process procedures are incorporated in
this review process, but the substantive law of each NAFTA country
remains unchanged.2 4
The goal of achieving an entirely new system of substantive rules
on dumping and subsidization is still being considered, but the
CFIA's "temporary" solution to the problem-binational panel review-has become, in effect, a "permanent" solution in NAFTA.
D. Scope of Article
In the following section of this Article, the structure and operation of the CFTA's dispute settlement provisions will first be reviewed, as those provisions provide the indispensable context in which
NAFTA was created and will itself operateP The changes brought to
those provisions by NAFTA will then also be reviewed. In addition,
22. Under these laws, the government investigates producers' claims that they have
been injured by imports that are considered to be unfairly priced ("dumped") or subsidized by foreign governments. If dumping or subsidies are found, the government may
decide to impose a duty that will offset the margin of the dumping or the rate of the subsidy. Under GATT and now the WTO, this extra AD or CVD duty is the only remedy that
may be imposed for this purpose. In the United States, if a party desires to appeal an

administrative decision made under these foreign trade laws, it mayt do so by filing an
appeal with the U.S. Court of International Trade. A similar procedure exists in Canada
and, very recently, in Mexico.
23. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 19, art. 1904.
24. Ik

25. The CFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms apply to cases brought before
NAFTA's entry into force. At this writing, only one NAFTA case has been brought to a
close. This occurred through an agreement of the parties without a panel opinion. Thus,
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largely by means of an attachment to this article, a comparison will be
drawn to the dispute settlement provisions of the recently concluded
Uruguay Round. 6
H. STRUCTURE OF THE CETA'S DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM
The CFTA provided two separate mechanisms for settling trade
disputes, which appeared in chapters 18 and 19 of the agreement.
Chapter 18 established the general procedures that applied in resolving disputes under the agreement, with two exceptions, and was broad
in scope. In addition to setting out the necessary institutional provisions for joint management of the CFTA, it provided for the use of
arbitration and ad hoc panels to resolve disputes with respect to most
matters of interpretation of the agreement and nullification or impairment of benefits conferred by the agreement 27
Chapter 19 was much narrower in focus. It established special ad
hoc panels to review final AD and CVD determinations issued by the
relevant administrative agencies in each country, as well as proposed
amendments to either country's AD or CVD statutes. Binational
panel review supplanted judicial review of such agency
determinations."
A.

Chapter 18 - InstitutionalProvisions

Chapter 18 shaped the resolution of general disputes arising
under the CFTA into a multi-tiered process, commencing with notification and consultation, followed by reference to a new intergovernmental binational commission, followed yet again by one of three
forms of dispute resolution conducted by independent, nongovernmental arbitrators or panels of experts.
A skeletal review of these processes follows:
e Mandatory notification by either government of any measure that
might affect the operation of the CFrA 9
- Mandatory response to questions or requests for information by
the other government, whether or not notified; 3°
essentially all conclusions drawn about the operation of the CFrA/NAFTA dispute settlement system must necessarily, initially, rest upon CFrA data and experiences.
26. DSU, supra note 7.
27. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 18.

28. Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(1).
29. Id. ch. 18, art. 1803(1).
30. Id. ch. 18, art. 1803(3).
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e Consultations at the request of either party concernkig any mea31

sure or any other matter affecting the operation of the CFA;
• Referral to the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission ("Commission"),
headed by the respective cabinet officials
responsible for trade mat32
ters, should such consultations fail;
e Invocation of one of three forms of panel proceeding, should the
Commission fail to resolve the matter:
- Compulsory arbitration, binding
on both parties, in safe33
guard ("escape clause") cases,
- Binding arbitration in all4 other disputes where the two governments mutually agree,3
- Panel recommendations to the Commission, which was35specifically required to agree on a resolution of the dispute.

Article 1807 of the CFTA allowed for five-member panels of experts36 to render advisory opinions and recommendations for settlement of disputes referred by the parties. 37 Under this provision, the
parties had to agree upon the terms of reference, select the binational
panel and its chairman, and agree upon a timetable for the conduct of
the panel review. The panel was obligated to establish its rules of procedure, unless the Commission decided otherwise.38 The rules of procedure provided for written submissions by each party, oral argument,
a draft report, comments on the draft by the parties, and a final report, which would normally issue within thirty days of the issuance of
the initial report. 39 The final report would be made public, unless the
40
parties decided to the contrary.
Out of the dozens of issues and disagreements which arose between the two parties after the CFTA came into effect, only five
reached the stage of binational panel review under chapter 18. These
included Canada'sLandingRequirementfor Pacific Coast Salmon and
31. Id. ch. 18, art. 1804(1).
32. Ik ch. 18, art. 1805(1).
33. 1d ch. 18, art. 1103.

34. Id ch. 18, art. 1806(1). In practice, no panels were ever convened under articles
1806 or 1103 of the CFTA.
35. ItL ch. 18, art. 1807.

36. Panelists were to be chosen "strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and
sound judgment and, where appropriate, have expertise in the particular matter under consideration. Panelists shall not be affiliated with or take instructions from either Party." Id
ch. 18, art. 1807(1).
37. Id. ch. 18, art. 1807.

38. I& ch. 18, art. 1807(4).
39. Id ch. 18, art. 1807(4)-(6).
40. Id. ch. 18, art. 1807(7).

•
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Herring,4 Lobsters from Canada,42 Treatment of Non-MortgageInterest UnderArticle 304,13 Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of UH.T. Milk from Quebec,4 and The Interpretation
of and Canada'sCompliance with Article 701.3 with Respect to Dunm
Wheat Sales.45 No chapter 18 cases under the CFTA are pending at
the time of this writing, and all cases of this kind initiated after January 1, 1994 must be brought under NAFTA's chapter 20 provisions.
B. Chapter 19 - ADICVD Cases and Pending Legislation
Chapter 19 of the CFTA set forth provisions for the creation and
use of binational panels to review final administrative determinations
in AD and CVD cases as well as for certain other purposes. Essentially, chapter 19 established a three-track set of obligations as follows:
* The development over a five- to seven-year period of a new set of
rules governing government subsidies and dumping; such practices
are currently governed by each country's existing AD and CVD
laws; 5
a Binational panel review of statutory amendments in existing AD
or CVD laws for their consistency with GATT, with the relevant
GATr Codes, and with the object and purpose of the CFIA;47
* Replacement of judicial review by domestic courts of AD or
CVD orders with review by a binational panel of experts.48
1. Development of a "Substitute System"
The development of a "substitute system" to deal with the
problems of dumping and subsidization did not progress, largely because of the energies being spent by Canada and the United States in
41. Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (Oct. 16, 1989), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File (CFTA Binational Panel).
42. Panel No. USA-89-1807-01, 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (May 25, 1990), available in

LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File (CFTA Binational Panel).
43. Panel No. USA-92-1807-01, June 8, 1992, reprinted in NAFTA: North American

Free TradeAgreements, DisputeSettlement, Binder 2, Booklet B.17 (James R. Holbein and
Donald J. Musch, eds. 1994) (CFI'A Binational Panel).
44. Panel No. USA-93-1807-01, 1993 FTAPD LEXIS 18 (June 3, 1993) available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFrA File (CFTA Binational Panel).
45. Panel No. CDA-92-1807-01, Feb. 8, 1993, reprinted in Holbein and Musch,
NAFTA. North American Free Trade Agreements, Dispute Settlement, Binder 2, Booklet
B.18 (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry 1994) (CFTA Binational Panel).
46. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1907(1).
47. Id. ch. 19, art. 1903(1).
48. Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(1).
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revising the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code4 9 and the Subsidies
Code 0 in the then on-going Uruguay Round."1 As a practical matter,
neither Canada nor the United States was able to give meaningful attention to the question of developing a substitute bilateralsystem during a period in which both nations were fully engaged in revising the
existing multilateralsystem. Nevertheless, the Canadian government
continues to go on record in favor of such a development and considers the absence of such
a substitute system to be a part of NAFrA's
52
unfinished business.

2. Review of Changes to Existing Legislation
Canada and the United States agreed that changes to either country's existing AD or CVD laws would apply to the other country only
after consultation and only if specifically provided for irthe new legislation.53 To enforce this obligation, either country could request that
a binational panel issue a declaratory opinion as to whether the proposed amendment to the other country's AD or CVD statutes conforms to GAIT, GATT Subsidies and Antidumping Codes, or the
object and purpose of the CFTA itself.54 The panel could also consider whether the proposed amendment was designed to overturn a
prior panel decision.5'
No panels were ever convened under this provision, principally
because proposed trade bills in both countries tended to include language exempting the other country from their coverage.
49. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, April 12, 1979,31 U.S.T. 4919,1186 U.N.T.S. 2 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980).

50. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 1186
U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980).
51. NAFrA contemplated the formation of a working group det.igned, in principal
part, to seek more effective rules and disciplines concerning the use of government subsi-

dies (this was of particular interest to the United States) and a substitute system of rules
for dealing with unfair pricing and government subsidization (of particular interest to Canada). NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 19, art. 1907(1)-(2). Although the working group was
formed, no significant work product emerged.

52. The Honorable Roy MacLaren, Address in San Francisco (Sept. 9, 1994) (The
Honorable Roy MacLaren is the Canadian Minister for International Trade).
53. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1903.
54. Id.
55. Id
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3. Replacement of Domestic JudicialReview of ADICVD Cases
The binational panels for settling disputes involving AD and
CVD law or cases operated separately from the general dispute settlement mechanism under chapter 18, using a different roster of panelists
and unique procedures. Either government could request a binational
panel review under chapter 19. However, any person who would
otherwise be entitled under the law of the importing country to commence domestic procedures for judicial review of a final determination could also request such a review and this request had to be
granted.5 6 Thus, both U.S. importers and exporters of a product
which had been subject to an agency determination in the United
States or Canada were entitled to trigger a chapter 19 binational panel
review proceeding, provided that they were an "interested party" to
such proceeding. 7 Requests for a panel had to be made in writing to
the other party within thirty days following the date of publication of
the final determination in question in the Canada Gazette or the FederalRegister.5 Failure to request a panel within that time precluded a
review, but a timely request by an interested party was deemed to be a
request by the United States under the applicable provisions 9
Binational panels reviewed final AD and CVD determinations
rendered by any of four different agencies, including the Canadian
International Trade Tribunal, the Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, the U.S. International Trade Commission, and the International Trade Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce.6 1

Each panel was required to apply the standard of judicial review62 and the law applicable in the country investigating the AD or
56. ld. ch. 19, art. 1904(5).
57. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1) (1995).
58. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1904(4).
59. Id
60. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal was formerly known, and designated in
the CFTA, as the Canadian Import Tribunal.
61. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1911.
62. Article 1904(3) provides that "[t]he panel shall apply the standard of review described in Article 1911 and the general legal principles that a court of the importing Party
otherwise would apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority." Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(3). The phrase "general legal principles" was defined as
"includ[ing] principles such as standing, due process, rules of statutory construction, mootness, and exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. ch. 19, art. 1911. Pursuant to these
articles, the applicable standard of review in the United States under the CFTA is that set
forth in section 1516a(b)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)
(1995). Under this standard of review, binational panels could hold unlawful any determi-
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CVD claim 3 Thus, each country was judged in terms of whether it
adhered to its own rules, not the rules of the other country.
In the United States, a panel would hold an agency determination unlawful if it was:
-"unsupported by substantial evidence on the record;" or
-"otherwise not in accordance with law."'6
Panels had the authority to uphold the agency determination or
to remand the decision to the relevant agency with specific instructions.65 Although the panels could not technically reverse an agency
determination, panels often took it upon themselves to remand such
determinations with very specific instructions, often the functional
equivalent of a reversal. Panel decisions were final and binding on the
relevant agencies" but were not precedential (they may be cited only
for their persuasive merit).
Importantly, strict timetables governed the procedures for filing
complaints and hearing disputes. For example, each binational panel
in principle had to issue its decision within 315 days of the request for
a panel.6 7 Under the provisions of article 1909, the two governments
established a small but ably managed secretariat-with offices in both
Ottawa and Washington, D.C.-to administer these procedures.
The panels consisted of five people chosen from a roster of fifty
qualified candidates, twenty-five selected by each government.68 In
nation by an agency found to be (i) unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
(ii) otherwise not in accordance with law. In Canada, pursuant to the Federal Court Act,
R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 28(1) (1985) (Can.), amended by ch. 8, § 18.1(4), 1990 S.C. 113 (Can.), the
test is whether the agency: (i) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or
refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (ii) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe; (iii) erred in law in
making a decision or order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; (iv)
based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that was made in a perverse or
capricious manner or without regard to the material before it; (v) acted, or failed to act, by
reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or (vi) acted in any other way that was contrary to
law.
63. Article 1904(2) states that "the antidumping or countervailing duty law consists of
the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial
precedents to the extent that a court of the importing Party would rely on such materials In
reviewing a final determination of the competent investigating authority." CFrA, supra
note 3, ch. 19, art. 1904(2).
64. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) (1995).
65. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1904(8).
66. The decision of a panel was "binding on the Parties with respect to the particular
matter between the Parties that [was] before the panel." Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(9). A final
determination by a panel was nonreviewable by a court. Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(11).
67. I ch. 19, art. 1904(14).
68. Id. ch. 19, annex 19012(1).
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the United States, the candidate list-which in practice was expanded
beyond the twenty-five minimum-was submitted to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance for
approval. The candidates could not be affiliated with either government, and because of the judicial nature of the process,
a majority of
69
the panelists, including its chair, had to be lawyers.
Panelists had to be acceptable to both sides. Each government
would choose two panelists and they would jointly choose the fifthY0
If the two governments could not agree on the fifth candidate, the
four original panelists would pick a fifth from the roster; failing that,
the choice would be made by lot.71 Each government was able to exercise four peremptory challenges on panelists chosen by the other
side? 2 Panelists were subject to high ethical standards; they had to
comply with specific codes of conduct and were required to sign protective orders for proprietary business and other privileged information.73 Violations were subject to sanction. 74
I
A.

SAFETY VALVES

Constitutionality of the Panel Review System

Two safety valves were built into the CFTA's dispute settlement
system. One, added by Congress, was the opportunity to raise a challenge to the constitutionality of the binational review process. Section
401(c) of the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 198875 provided that:
An action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, or both, regarding a determination on the grounds that any provision of, or
amendment made by, the United States-Canada Free-Trade Implementation Act of 1988 implementing the binational panel dispute
settlement system under chapter 19 of the Agreement violates the
Constitution may be brought in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Prior to the final adoption and implementation of the CFrA,
Congress was concerned about, and considered in detail, the possibil69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id
Id. ch.
Id. ch.
Id. ch.
Id. ch.
Id. clL

19,
19,
19,
19,
19,

annex
annex
annex
annex
annex

19012(2)-(3).
1901.2(3).
1901.2(2).
19012(6)-(7).
1901.2(8).

75. Jan. 2, 1988, Pub. L. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, 1879, 27 LLM. 281 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4) (1995)).
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ity that the binational panel dispute settlement system might violate
one or several clauses of the United States Constitution, including Articles I, II and III, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.76 The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, after conducting a public hearing and receiving the views
of several leading constitutional scholars on the issues, stated that
"[t]he Committee, after extensive analysis, has concluded that the
FTA is constitutional."77 The Committee's report is a valuable summary of the constitutional issues in question, and the views expressed
by the Committee appear to be in accord with the general views expressed by most constitutional scholars and trade law practitioners.
In August 1992 a labor-dominated trade association, the National
Council for Industrial Defense, joined by the American Engineering
Association, filed the first constitutional challenge in the U.S. District
Court, requesting a declaratory judgment on the issues noted above.7 8
Although the timing of this action suggests that the suit may have
been filed in an attempt to torpedo the then-pending NMAFTA negotiations, the action was79later dismissed on procedural grounds, including
lack of jurisdiction.
A more serious constitutional challenge was filed in September
1994 by the U.S.-based Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports ("Coalition"). This action was filed in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit,8 0 as the statute requires, and was the outgrowth
of the Coalition's failure to prevail in the binational panel proceeding
76. The argument with respect to Article I involves the ceding, abdicating or delegating to binational panels the judicial powers encompassed within the sovereignty of the

United States. The Article II violation concerns the possible violation of the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. ART. I1, § 2, cL.. 2, which specifies that "officers of the United
States" are to be appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Article III,
section 1 could be said to be violated because the binational panels have been vested with

adjudicatory powers yet are not covered by the protections of that clause. Finally, the Fifth
Amendment concern is that U.S. citizens may be deprived of their rights to due process
and equal protection of the law as a result of the lack of judicial review of the decisions of
the binational panels.
77. House COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1988).
78. National Council for Indus. Defense v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 794 (D.C.
1993). See also INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 21, 1992, at 3.

79. National Council, 827 F. Supp. at 800.
80. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States, Civ. Action No. 94-1627,
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1994).
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involving Certain Softwood Lumber Productsfrom Canada.sl In its
complaint, the Coalition attacked the constitutionality of the panel
system both on a general basis and as applied in the softwood lumber
proceeding. This attack was short-lived, however, as two months
later, the Coalition announced that it was withdrawing the litigation as
a result of a political settlement reached between the governments of
Canada and the United States pursuant to which regular consultations
on trade in lumber are to be held.82
B. ExtraordinaryChallenge Procedure
The second safety valve adopted in the CFTA was the extraordinary challenge procedure established by chapter 19:
Where, within a reasonable time after the panel decision is issued, a
Party alleges that:
(a)(i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct,
bias, or a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially
violated the rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of
procedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or
jurisdiction set forth in this Article, and
(b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of
the binational panel review process,
that Party may avail itself of the extraordinary challenge
procedure set out in Annex

3
1 9 0 4 .1 3 .s

Annex 1904.13 contemplates the formation of a three-member
extraordinary challenge committee (ECC) to hear such allegations.
ECC members are taken from a special ten-person roster comprised
of judges or former judges of a federal court of the United States or a
court of superior jurisdiction of Canada.84
The extraordinary challenge procedure has been invoked in three
instances: Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Porkfrom Canada,s Live Swine
81. Panel No. ECC-94-1904-O1USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (Aug. 3,1994), available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File (CFrA Binational Panel).
82. See Coalition Press Release, Dec. 15, 1994 and Press Release of United States
Trade Representative Michael Kantor, Dec. 15, 1994.
83. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1904(13).
84. Id. ch. 19, annex 1904.13(1).
85. Panel No. ECC-91-1904-01USA, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 8 (Mar. 29, 1991) and 1991
FTAPD LEXIS 7 (June 14, 1991), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File
(CFTA Binational Panel).
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from Canada,86 and Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada.'
IV.

OPERATION OF THE CFI'A DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

After the CFTA first came into effect, there was considerable apprehension about this novel system of dispute resolution. a8 Concerns
were expressed about the development of an independent jurisprudence in AD and CVD cases, about the quality and consistency of the
decision-making, about whether there would be too many cases for
the system to handle, and about whether the panel discussions would
tend to break along national lines. As it has operated, however, these
concerns have largely been laid to rest. While the underlying subsidy
and preferential treatment issues remain unresolved by the two governments, the binational panel review mechanism, particularly in
chapter 19 cases, has received almost uniformly high marks for the
manner in which it has operated. 89
It is generally perceived, for example, that the panels have not
developed a jurisprudence independent from that developed by the
U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), although certain panel decisions have differed from specific CIT decisions on the same issues. It
should be recognized, however, that CIT judges differ among themselves on certain issues, and it should not be surprising that individual
panels may differ from the CIT or from other panels on a specific
question. 90
86. The U.S. Trade Representative on Behalf of the U.S. Gov't v.
ada, Panel No. ECC-93-1904-01 USA, 1993 FTAPD LEXIS 1 (Apr. 8,
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File (CFrA Binational Panel).
87. The U.S. Trade Representative on Behalf of the U.S. Gov't v.
ada, Panel No. ECC-94-1904-01 USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (Aug. 3,

the Gov't of Can1993), available In
the Gov't of Can1994), availableIn

LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File (CFTA Binational Panel).
88. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, BinationalPanelDispute Settlement Under Chapters 18 and
19 of the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade agreement: An Interim Appraisal,24 N.Y.U. J.
INr'L L. & POL. 269, 270 (1991).

89. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade
Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707 (1993).
90. Although decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court are binding on binational panels, CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1904(2),
decisions of the CIT do not constitute binding precedent. See Rhone Poulenc v. United
States, 583 F. Supp. 607, 612 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (A decision of the CIT is "valuable,
though non-binding, precedent unless and until it is reversed."); Replacement Parts for
Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, 1990 FTAIPD LEXIS 3 (Mar.
7, 1990) (CFTA Binational Panel). Likewise, a decision of one article 1904 panel is not
binding on future panels. CFTA, supra note 3, ch. 19, art. 1904(9).
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The quality and consistency of the decision-making has for the
most part been a nonissue, as the trade bar considers the panel opinions to be unusually thorough and generally of a very high quality.
Moreover, despite the ad hoc character of the panel process, its credibility has benefitted from the consistency of the panel decisions from
one case to another.
In addition, the case load has been managed quite effectively. As
of January 1, 1995, there have been fifty-four cases brought under the
CFTA chapter 19 provisions. These include thirty-two cases involving
U.S. agency determinations, nineteen cases involving Canadian
agency determinations, and three extraordinary challenge committees
involving U.S. agency determinations. In comparison, a total of
eleven NAFTA cases have been filed, three in Mexico, three in the
United States, and five in Canada. Of the five Canadian NAFTA
cases, one has been terminated.91
Finally, the concern that the panelists would divide along national lines has also proven to be a nonissue. Nearly all decisions have
been unanimous, although some panelists have availed themselves of
the opportunity to prepare separate assenting or dissenting remarks.
The operation of the chapter 18 process is in general more restrictive and less visible than the operation of the chapter 19 process. The
purpose of chapter 18 panels is to provide reports and recommendations to the two governments with the view of assisting the governments in their own efforts to settle the ongoing dispute. With this
point in mind, the chapter 18 panels have clearly been beneficialsolutions ultimately reached by the governments have often closely
approximated those recommended. Even where this was not the case,
the panels no doubt have played an important role in helping define
and resolve the issues, as well as in moderating or eliminating the
political stresses that might well have exacerbated the disputes.
The three extraordinary challenge committees have undertaken
their work in deliberate fashion. The first two committees rendered
unanimous opinions, in language that has in some instances proved
helpful to the panels. On the other hand, the last committee broke
sharply, with the three-member committee issuing three separate,
sometimes sharply worded opinions that unfortunately will not have
the same beneficial impact.
91. Telephone Interview with James R Holbein, United States NAFTA Secretary
(Feb. 7, 1995).
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At this writing the U.S. General Accounting Office is preparing a
report on the CFrA and NAFTA panel process, which will be the
most thorough review to date of that effort.
V.
A.

NAFTA'S DISPUTE SETITLEMENT PROVISIONS

From the CFTA to NAFTA

The dispute settlement provisions of chapters 19 and 20 of
NAFTA parallel their comparable provisions (chapters 19 and 18) in
the CFTA. Chapter 19 of NAFFA largely duplicates, on a trilateral
basis, the provisions of chapter 19 of the CFTA and incorporates a few
additional changes. Chapter 20 of NAFTA, however, expands the
scope of the CFTA's chapter 18 provisions and includes some other
important innovations.
The most important changes made by NAFTA in the dispute settlement area may be highlighted as follows:
- The addition of a mechanism for settlement
of dispute:; between a
9
party and an investor of another party; 2
* The potential use of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms
93
such as good offices, conciliation, mediation, and expert advice;
- The use of scientific review boards, which are permitted to study
and report to the parties or to chapter 20 panels on factual issues
concerning
environmental, health, safety or other scientific
94
matters;
e The addition of financial services
disputes under the chapter 20
95
dispute resolution mechanism;
* The elimination of binding arbitration;
* A new method of panel selection (Le., reverse panel selection) in
chapter 20 cases, pursuant to which the parties jointly choose the
chair (who may be from the third NAFTA party), and each of the
disputing96 parties selects two panel members from the other
country;

e The creation of two new advisory committees: one entitled the
Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Dispute,;97 and the
other the Advisory Committee
on Private Commercial Disputes re98
garding Agricultural Goods.

92. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11.

93. IL ch. 20, art. 2007(5)(b).
94. Id. ch. 20, art. 2015(1).

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id
Id
Id
Id

ch. 14, art. 1414.
ch. 20, art. 2011(1)(b).
ch. 20, art. 2022(4).
ch. 7, art. 707.
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B. NAFTA's General Dispute Settlement Procedures
The dispute settlement procedures of NAFTA are intended to
provide expeditious and effective means for the resolution of disputes,
building upon the comparable provisions of both the World Trade Organization (WTO) 99 and the CFTA. The following table illustrates
the overall structure of NAFTA's dispute settlement procedures. 100
NAFTA Dispute Settlement Procedures

99. Attached as an appendix to this article is a comparison of the dispute settlement
provisions reached in the recently concluded Uruguay Round negotiations with the Chapter 20 dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA. Additional appendices (Figures 1-2) contain the timelines for dispute resolution in both the WVTO and NAFTA.
100. NAF"A: What's It All About?, External Affairs and International Trade Canada
(Ottawa, Government of Canada 1993).
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C. Election of Remedies: WTO v. NAFTA
As suggested by the above table, certain disputes between
NAFTA parties may conceivably lie in either the WTO or in NAFTA,
as all three countries are party to both agreements. 10 1 In these situations, if a dispute could be brought under both the WTO and NAFTA,
it is within the discretion of the complaining party to choose either
forum.'02 However, if the complaining party has selected the WTO
and the third NAFTA party, following the requisite notication, wants
to bring the same case under NAFTA, the two complaining parties
must consult, with a view to agreeing on a single forum.10 3 If the parties cannot agree, the dispute settlement proceeding normally will be
heard by a NAFTA panel.0 4 Once selected, the chosen forum must
be used to the exclusion of the other.105
In addition, if a dispute involves factual issues regarding certain
standards-related environmental, health, safety, or conservation measures or if the dispute arises under specific environmental agreements,
the responding party may elect to have the dispute considered by a
NAFTA panel, which would become the exclusive fontm. 1°6
VI.
A.

CHAPTER 20 PROVISIONS

NAFTA's Institutional Arrangements

Keeping in place the structure created by the CFTA, NAFTA establishes two institutions which are collectively responsible for implementing the agreement, ensuring its joint management, and
preventing and settling any disputes between NAFTA. countries regarding the agreement's interpretation and application.
1.

The Free Trade Commission

The central institution of NAFTA is the Free Trade Commission
("Commission"), which is comprised of Ministers or cabinet-level of101. The United States and Canada were founding members of the GAIT, joining on
January 1, 1948, while Mexico joined GATI"on August 24, 1986. Canada, Mexico and the
United States completed their ratification of the WTO (Uruguay Round) Agreements as
of December 31, 1994, and therefore joined the WTO as of January 1, 1995.
102. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 20, art. 2005(1).

103. I& cl. 20, art. 2005(2).
104. Id
105. Id. ch. 20, art. 2005(6).
106. Id. ch. 20, art. 2005(4).
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ficers designated by each NAFTA country.10 7 The Commission is

charged with the obligation to supervise the implementation of the
agreement, oversee its further development, resolve disputes regarding its interpretation or application, supervise the work of the various
committees and working groups, and consider any other matters affecting the operation of the agreement 3 8 Regular meetings of the
Commission are to be held annually, alternating among the three
countries, 1°9 although its day-to-day work will as a practical matter be
carried out at the staff level through the various committees and
working groups established by the agreement.110 The agreement specifically calls for decisions of the Commission to be taken by consensus, unless otherwise agreed."'
The Commission may establish and delegate responsibilities to ad
hoc or standing committees, working groups, or expert groups.'12 Indeed, the operation of these committees and groups will no doubt
prove to be central to the operation and administration of the agreement as a whole. While the Commission may create such committees
and groups at any time, a significant number of them were agreed
upon at the time NAFTA came into force. Annex 2001.2 establishes
eight committees, with five designated subcommittees, and six work3
ing groups, with one designated subgroup."
The Commission may seek the advice of non-governmental experts or groups and, to the extent parties
agree, may take other ac4
tions in the exercise of its functions."
107. 1& ch. 20, art. 2001(1). In practice, the Commission will be made up of the Canadian Minister for International Trade, the United States Trade Representative, and the
Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development.
108. Id. ch. 20, art. 2001(2).
109. Id. ch. 20, art. 2001(5).

110. Id. ch. 20, art. 2001(3).
111. Id. ch. 20, art. 2001(4).
112. Id ch. 20, art. 2001(3).
113. Id. ch. 20, annex 2001.2. The chairs of these committees will be senior government
officials and the participants will be the appropriate officials from each government.
Although no provision was expressly made for private sector participation in the committees, it appears to be the case that committees are free to form working groups and subcommittees which will be able to include private sector advisors and experts. See JAMEs R.
HOLBEiN, NAFTA: ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRE.mETcr 3 (1993). See also Angeles M.
Villarreal, NAFTA: Conmittees, Working Groups,and Other Organizations,Congressional
Research Service, (Washington, DC The Library of Congress, Apr. 1994).
114. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 20, art. 2001(3)(b)-(c).
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2. NAFTA Secretariat
Article 2002 of NAFTA also establishes a Secretariat to serve the
Commission, as well as other subsidiary bodies, and to serve the dispute settlement panels." 5 The Secretariat is a unique organization,
consisting of "mirror-image" offices in the three capital cities, each of
which works together in administering both chapter 20 and chapter 19
dispute settlement panels." 6 The Secretariat also serves as administrator for the extraordinary challenge committees and acts as the clerk
of court and institutional memory for the entire panel process.
B.

The Chapter20 Dispute Resolution Procedure
1.

Consultations

Under NAFTA, clear priority is given to the resolution of disputes through amicable consultations. In the first clause of the dispute settlement section, the parties declare that they:
shall at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement, and shall make every attempt through cooperation and consultations to arrive at a mutually 11
satisfactory
7
resolution of any matter that might affect its operation.

Requests for consultation regarding an actual or proposed measure or any other matter that one NAFTA party considers might affect
the operation of the agreement may be made in writing." 8 If a third
party believes that it has a substantial interest in the matter, it will be
entitled to participate in the consultations or seek its own consultations."19 The agreement requires that the consulting parties "make
every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution" of the
matter in dispute. 20

2. Review by the Commission
Should the parties' own efforts at consultation fail to resolve the
matter within thirty to forty-five days, any party may call a meeting of
the Commission with all three countries present.' Article 2007 of
the agreement directs the Commission to seek to settle the dispute
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. ch. 20, art. 2002.
HOLBEIN, supra note 113, at 2.
NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 20, art. 2003.
1I ch. 20, art. 2006(1).
Id. ch. 20, art. 2006(3).
Id. ch. 20, art. 2006(5).
Id ch. 20, art. 2007(1).
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promptly, requiring the Commission to convene within ten days of the
request. 2 The Commission is permitted by the agreement to call on
technical advisers, working groups, or expert groups as it deems necessary; in addition, it may use good offices, mediation, conciliation or
other means of alternative dispute resolution as a means of achieving
a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute.'M
3. Initiation of PanelProceedings

If the Commission fails to resolve the dispute, any consulting
country can submit a request for an arbitral panel and thus initiate
panel proceedings. 24 The Commission is required to establish such a
panel upon delivery of the appropriate request.25 A third party that
considers it has a substantial interest in the matter is entitled to join as

a complaining party on delivery of the requisite notice of intention to

participateY26 The third party may choose, however, to limit its par-

ticipation to the making of oral and written submissions.
The panel will typically be charged with making findings of fact,
determining whether the action taken by the defending country is inconsistent with its obligations under NAFTA, and issuing recommendations for resolution of the dispute.127

Chapter 20 panels will be composed of five members, chosen
from a trilaterally agreed upon roster of eminent trade, legal, and8
other experts, including people from countries outside NAFTA.2
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. ch. 20, art. 2007(4).

Id. ch. 20, art. 2007(5).
Id. ch. 20, art 2008(1).
Id cit 20, art. 2008(2).

126. Id. ch. 20, art. 2008(3).
127. In the United States, chapter 20 panel reports will have no direct effect on domestic law or agencies. Neither federal agencies nor state governments will be bound by any
finding or recommendation included in such reports. Thus, panel reports will not provide
legal authority for federal agencies to change their regulation, procedures, or refusals to
enforce particular laws or regulations, such as those related to human, animal or plant
health, or the environment. In all cases following a panel report, NAFTA in effect makes
any change in U.S. law discretionary and leaves to the United States the manner in which
any such change would be implemented-whether through the adoption of legislation, a
change in regulation, judicial action, or otherwise. Statement of Administrative Action, at
214, reprintedin NORTH AMERicAN FREE TRArE AGRFmrN, TFaxrs OF AGREF-_mh-r,
IMPLEMNTInG BL, STATEE NT OF ADM NmTRATvE AcrIoN, AND REqIUED SuppoRT.

H.R. Doc No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1993).
128. The parties must establish and maintain a roster of up to 30 individuals to serve as
panelists. These roster members are to "have expertise or experience in law, international
trade, other matters covered by this Agreement or the resolution of disputes arising under
international trade agreements, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment." NAFMA, supra note 2, ch. 20, arL 2009(2)(a). The roster
ING STATEMENTS,
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The agreement provides for a special roster of experts for disputes
involving financial services. 2 9
Chapter 20 panels are chosen through a process of "reverse selection," designed to ensure impartiality. The chair of the panel will be
selected first, either by agreement of the disputing countries or, failing
agreement, by designation of one disputing side, chosen by lot. 130 The
chair may not be a citizen of the side making the selection and may be
a non-NAFTA national. Each side will then select two additional pan131
elists who are citizens of the country or countries on the other side.
Whenever an individual not on the roster of panelists is nominated,
any other disputing NAFTA country
may exercise a peremptory chal32
lenge against that individual.
The Commission is to adopt a Model Rules of Procedure, which
provide for written submissions, rebuttals, and at least one oral hearing.133 There are strict time limits to ensure prompt resolution. TWo
other provisions of NAFTA permit the panels or the parties themselves to consult various experts to help resolve the disputes. Article
2014 is a general provision permitting the panels to seek information
and technical advice from any persons or body deemed appropriate,
while article 2015 permits scientific review boards to provide expert
advice to panels on factual questions related to the environment and
other scientific matters.
Unless the disputing parties have otherwise decided, the panel
will present its initial report-which will be confidential-to the parties within ninety days of a panel's selection.3 The parties will then
have fourteen days in which to provide comments to the panel.135
'Within thirty days of the presentation of its initial report, the panel
members must also be independent of, and not affiliated with or take instructions from,
any party. Id ch. 20, art. 2009(2)(b). Finally, the roster members must comply with the
applicable code of conduct established by the Commission. Id. ch. 20, art. 2009(2)(c).
129. Id.
ch. 14, art. 1414.
130. Id.ch. 20, art. 2011.
131. Id ch. 20, art. 2011(1)(c), (2)(c).
132. 1d ch. 20, art. 2011(3).
133. Id ch. 20, art. 2012(1). Although article 2012(1) requires the Ccmmission to establish Model Rules of Procedure by January 1, 1994, such rules still have not issued. Informed reports indicate that the three governments do not see eye to eye regarding the
degree to which the dispute settlement process will be subject to public scrutiny, with the
Canadian and Mexican governments tending to favor a greater degree of confidentiality
than the United States.
134. Id ch. 20, art. 2016(2).
135. Id. ch. 20, art. 2016(4).
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will present its final report to the parties concerned.3 6 The report will
then be transmitted to the Commission for publication. 137
4. Implementation and Non-Compliance
Upon receiving the panel's report, the disputing parties are to
agree on the resolution of the dispute, which will usually conform to
the recommendations of the panel. 138 If a panel determines that the
responding party has acted in a manner inconsistent with its NAFTA
obligations, and the disputing parties do not reach agreement within
thirty days or within another mutually agreed upon period after receipt of the report, the complaining party may suspend the application
of equivalent benefits until the issue is resolved. 39 Any party that
considers the retaliation to be excessive may obtain a panel ruling on
this question.' 4"
VII. CHAPTER 19 PROVISIONS
A.

Highlights

Chapter 19 of NAFTA also incorporates several new innovations,
including a preference for judges as panelists and a new "safeguard"
mechanism to protect the panel process. Other new elements include
improvements in the standards for extraordinary challenges and requirements that all three countries incorporate predictability, transparency, and fairness into both their administrative and judicial
processes.
Although the United States and Canada were not required to
make significant changes in their law to accommodate the revised
chapter 19 structure, Mexico was required to make extensive changes,
which it has already accomplished.1 4 '
136. Id ch. 20, art. 2017(1).

137. Id ch. 20, art. 2017(3)-(4).
138. Id ch. 20, art. 2018(1).
139. Id ch. 20, art. 2019(1).
140. Id. ch. 20, art. 2019(3).

141. Mexico committed to changing its AD and CVD laws in 21 specific ways. Id. ch.
19, annex 1904.15. These included fundamental steps designed to ensure due process, such

as written notice to interested parties of the initiation of an investigation; full participation
for such parties in the administrative process, including the right to administrative appeal
and judicial review;,written notice of any decisions rendered by the investigating authority,
and a detailed statement of the basis for any final decisions made. Id. Mexico's new Foreign Trade Law (Ley de Comercio Exterior), published in the DiarioOficial de /a Federa.
ci6n on July 27, 1993, and amended on December 22, 1993, implemented many of the

required changes. See Craig Raymond Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and Counter-
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B. Article 1904
1. Operation of NAFTA Chapter19 Panels
As was the case with respect to the CFTA, under NAFTA, each
country retains, and may amend at any time, its own AD and CVD
laws.142 Article 1903 also provides that a NAFTA party may request a
binational panel to review whether an amendment to another NAFTA
party's AD or CVD statutes is consistent with chapter 19.143
Article 1904 is once again the source of authority for the creation
of independent binational panels, composed of judges and experts
from the two NAFTA countries involved. The panels will review final
AD and CVD determinations made by the relevant administering authorities in one country with respect to products from one of the other
two countries.'" Notwithstanding the fact that NAFTA is now a tripartite agreement, chapter 19 panels will continue to be binational in
composition. 145 Thus, if a final determination is reached with respect
to identical products being simultaneously imported into one NAFTA
country from the other two NAFTA countries, two NAFTA panelsone for each exporting country-would be established in the context
of an appeal of that determination.
Annex 1901.2 of NAFTA sets out the detailed standards for the
formation of binational panels, contemplating that each of the three
countries will select at least twenty-five candidates but providing, in
this instance, that the roster for binational panels "shall include judges
and former judges to the fullest extent practicable. 146 The United
States has been the principal actor in attempting to secure sitting and
retired judges as panel members, expressing the view that panels containing judges are less likely to create an independeat jurisprudence in
AD and CVD cases than would otherwise be the case, 4 7 but at this
writing no judges, sitting or retired, have been placed on the chapter
19 roster.
vailing Duty System: Policy and Legal Implications, as well as PracticalBusiness Risks and
Realities,for United States Exporters to Mexico in the Era of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 25 ST. MAR-i's L.J. 889 (1994).
142. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 19, arts. 1901, 1902.
143. Id. ch. 19, art. 1903(1).
144. Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(2).
145. Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(1).

146. Id. ch. 19, annex 1901.2(1).
147. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 127, at 195, 199-201.
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2. ExtraordinaryChallenge Procedure
Another significant change to article 1904 in NAFrA, as compared to its predecessor CF1A provision, is the change to the extraordinary challenge committee provision which emphasizes that
failure by a binational panel to apply the appropriate standard of review would qualify as a ground for ECC review.1' s This change was
intended to make clear that a binational panel that failed to apply the
appropriate standard of review would per se be considered to have
manifestly exceeded its powers, authority, or jurisdiction. The purpose of the change is to maximize the uniformity of panel decisions,
with each other and with established U.S. law.149
Two additional changes from the CFTA procedures for ECCs,
found in annex 1904.13 of NAFTA, require ECCs to examine the legal
and factual analysis underlying the findings and conclusions of the
panel's decision, and provide ECCs with ninety days (thirty days
under the CFrA) from the date of their establishment to render a
decision. 5 1 As stated by Congress, this first change is intended to
"clarify that an ECC's responsibilities do not end with simply ensuring that the panel articulated the correct standard of review." ECCs
must examine whether the panel analyzed the substantive law and un151
derlying facts.
3. SafeguardProvision
The last important innovation to the NAFMA chapter 19 provisions was the addition of article 1905, entitled "Safeguarding the Panel
Review System." Under this provision, a party may request consultations whenever another party:
a. has prevented the establishment of a panel requested by the
complaining Party;
b. has prevented a panel requested by the complaining Party from
rendering a final decision;
c. has prevented the implementation of the decision of a panel requested by the complaining Party or denied it binding force and
148. NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 19, art. 1904(13). Article 1904(13) allows a party to

avail itself of the extraordinary challenge procedure of annex 1904.13 if "the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out in this Article, for example by

failing to apply the appropriate standard of review." Id. ch. 19, art. 1904(13)(a)(iii).
149. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 127.
150. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 19, annex 1904.13(2)-(3).
151. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 127, at 197.
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effect with respect to the particular matter that was before the
panel; or
d. has resulted in a failure to provide opportunity for review of a
final determination by a panel or court of competent jurisdiction
that is independent of the competent investigating authorities, that
examines the basis for the competent investigating authority's determination and whether the authority properly applied domestic
antidumping and countervailing duty law in reaching the challenged
determination, and that employs the relevant standard of review
identified in article 1911.152

The consultations under this provision must begin within fifteen
days of the making of the request and if not resolved within forty-five
days of the request, or such later date as the consulting parties may
agree, the complaining party may request the establishment of a special committee. 153 Such special committee must be foimed within fifteen days of a request and each of its three members will be picked
from a special roster established under annex 1904.13.154 The special
committee must follow rules of procedure established by the
parties.' 55
If the special committee makes an affirmative finding with respect to one or another of the above grounds, the parties must commence consultations on this finding within ten days of the issuance of
the committee's report with the view of reaching a "mutually satisfactory solution" within sixty days. 5 6 However, if the parties are unable
to reach such a solution and the problem is not corrected, the complaining party may then suspend either (a) the operation of article
1904 against a party; or (b) the application of appropriate benefits
under the agreement. 157
CHAPTER 11 PROVISIONS
NAFTA is unique among trade agreements because of its comprehensive regime for settling disputes between foreign investors and
host governments, including a mechanism for an investor to pursue a
claim against a host government that has breached its obligations
under section A of chapter 11.158 This mechanism' 59 entitles an invesVIII.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 19, art. 1905(1)(a)-(d).
Id. ch. 19, art. 1905(1)-(2).
Id. ch. 19, art. 1905(3)-(5).
Id. ch. 19, art. 1905(6).
Id. ch. 19, art. 1905(7).
Id. ch. 19, art. 1905(8).
Id. ch. 11, art. 1116(1)(a).
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tor to submit its claim to binding arbitration under internationally accepted rules.
Obligations set forth in section A that might be the subject of a
claim for binding arbitration by an investor include:
* Failure by the host government to accord an investor national
treatment with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management,16 conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments;
* Failure by the host government to accord a foreign investor
most16 1
favored-nation treatment with respect to such activities;
* Failure by the host government to accord a foreign investor1 the
62
better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment;
• Failure by the host government to accord a foreign investor
a
1 63
minimum standard of treatment under international law,
- Imposition by the host government of specific performance requirements such as minimum export levels, domestic content rules,
preferences for domestic sourcing, trade balancing,
exclusive sup1
ply, and technology transfer requirements; 64
* Imposition by the host government of a requirement
that the se165
nior management be of a particular nationality;
0 Failure by the host government to permit free transfers of profits,
payments and other investment returns in a freely usable currency,166 or to permit the conversion167of local currency into foreign
currency at prevailing market rates;
0 Noncomplying expropriation of the investment by the host
government. 168
159. The chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism is patterned after the mechanism
utilized in the various U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs). See Patricia McKinstry
Robin, The BIT Won't Bite: The American BilateralInvestment Treaty Program,33 Am. U.
L. REv. 931 (1984).
160. Id. ch. 11, art. 1102(1).
161. Id. ch. 11, art. 1103(1).
162. Id. ch. 11, art. 1104.
163. Id ch. 11, art. 1105.
164. Id. ch. 11, art. 1106(1).

165. Id. ch. 11, art. 1107(1). However, a host government may require that the majority
of a board of an enterprise located in its territory be of a particular nationality and may
require that investors be residents in that territory, as long as control of the enterprise and
protections afforded the investors are not materially impaired. Id. ch. 11, arts. 1107, 1111.
166. This provision also covers arbitral awards or settlements and any compensation
due as a result of expropriation by the host government.
167. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1109(1)-(2). Transfers may be made at the prevailing market rates, but will be subject to the equitable and non-discriminatory application of securities, bankruptcy, criminal and reporting laws.
168. Id. ch. 11, art. 1110(1). Under article 1110, expropriation is only allowed (i) for a
public purpose; (ii) on a non-discriminatory basis; (iii) in accordance with due process of
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The protections afforded by section A of chapter 11 are subject to
certain important limitations, including the fact that financial services
are excluded, 169 as are various laws and sectors identified in annexes I
through IV of NAFTA. Annex 1138.2 also excludes decisions made in
Canada under the Investment Canada Act and in Meico by the National Commission on Foreign Investment (Comisi6n Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras) from dispute settlement under chapter 11.170
Historically speaking, trade agreements that treat investment issues have generally provided only for government-to-government dispute settlement. Private parties may petition their governments to
initiate dispute settlement proceedings, but do not have any direct
rights under such agreements. Mexico and numerous other Latin
American countries have traditionally required foreign investors to
waive any right of diplomatic protection from their governments and
to seek only remedies available under domestic law. This practice, an
example of the Calvo Doctrine,has served as an impediment to investment in Mexico and much of Latin America. 171 Thus, the inclusion in
NAFTA of the chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism represents a
significant change in attitude on the part of Mexico and a potential
significant improvement for the settlement of disputes through
arbitration.
A. Nature of Claims
Articles 1116 and 1117 of NAFTA set forth the kinds of claims
that may be submitted to arbitration. To invoke a claim, the investor
must allege a direct injury to himself or an indirect injury to a firm in
law and minimum standards of international law; and (iv) on payment of compensation.
Id. Neither of the terms "compensation" or "public purpose" is defined.

169. See id. ch. 14 for treatment of financial services.
170. Id. ch. 11, annex. 1138.2.
171. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution embodies the Calvo Doctrine in the follow-

ing language (quoting pertinent part):
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right
to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their easements, or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or waters. The State may grant the same right
to foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consider themselves as nationals and not to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in the case of noncompliance
with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property they had acquired to the benefit
of the nation.

Max. CONsr., art. 27. The Calvo Doctrine in effect provides that foreigners are not entitled
to any rights or privileges that are not available to nationals of the country invoking it.
Thus, foreigners must submit any claims involving property or the like to the jurisdiction of
its national courts and waive protection of their home country's laws.

1995]

Dispute Settlement Under the CFTA and NAFTA

the host country that is owned or controlled by the investor. In either
case, the claim must involve an allegation of breach of section A or of
certain provisions governing the behavior of government monopolies
in chapter 15. All claims must be brought within three years of the
date on which the investor knew, or should have known, of the alleged
breach of NAFTA and resulting damage but, to allow the disputing
parties time for consultations and negotiations, the claim may not be
submitted until six months have elapsed from the date of the
breach. 172
Decisions by a host government to prohibit or limit investment
on national security grounds are excluded from chapter 11 dispute settlements. 173 In addition, Canadian and Mexican decisions to prohibit
or restrict an acquisition under their laws providing for screening of
foreign investment will be excluded from dispute settlement under
either chapter 11 or chapter 20.17
B.

Initiation of Dispute Settlement Proceedings

NAFrA emphasizes consultation and negotiation as the first step
in handling an investment dispute. 175 Articles 1119 and 1120 set forth
the process leading up to the submission of a dispute to an arbitral
panel, with article 1119 specifying in particular that an investor must
provide notice of its intention to submit a claim to arbitration at least
ninety days before doing so, and specifying further the content of such
notice. 7 6 Article 1120 provides that once six months have elapsed
from the events giving rise to a claim, the investor may the submit the
claim for arbitration to:
0 the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),'"provided both the country of the investor and the
host country are parties to the ICSID Convention;
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1120.
Id. ch. 11, art. 1138(1).
Id. ch. 11, art. 1138(2), annex 1138.2.
Id. ch. 11, art. 1118.
Id. ch. 11, art. 1119.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-

als of Other States, done Mar. 18,1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,575 U.N.T.S. 159 [ICSID Convention]. In the United States, see Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act
of 1966, Aug. 11, 1966, 80 Stat. 344, 5 I.L.M. 820 [codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650-1650a
(1989)]. Neither Canada nor Mexico currently is a party to the ICSID Convention, which
prevents its current use in connection with NAFTA-related investment disputes.
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* ICSID's "Additional Facility, ' 178 in the event one such country is
not a party to the Convention; or
* an ad hoc arbitral tribunal established under the arbitration rules
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).179

C. Jurisdictional Requirements
Articles 1121 and 1122 set out rules for establishing the requisite
mutual consent for arbitration. The investor must consent in writing
to arbitration and waive the right to initiate or continue any action in
local courts or other fora relating to the disputed measure, except for
actions for injunctive or other extraordinary relief. 180 To ensure that a
host country cannot frustrate an arbitration by withholding its own
consent, article 1122 itself constitutes advance consent to arbitration
by the three NAFTA governments.' 8 '
D. Appointment of Arbitrators
Article 1123 of NAFTA provides generally for the establishment
of three-member arbitral tribunals, one member to be appointed by
each of the disputants, and the presiding arbitrator to be appointed by
agreement between the disputants. 182 If, within ninet.y days of the
submission of the claim to arbitration, a disputant fails to appoint an
arbitrator, or the two disputants fail to agree on a presiding183arbitrator,
the ICSID Secretary-General shall appoint an arbitrator.
178. ICSID Additional Facilityfor the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and
Fact-FindingProceedings,Doc. ICSID/11 (Washington: International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1979). At this writing, the Additional Facility could be used
only if the United States was the host government in an investment dispute or if a national
of the United States was involved in a dispute in which Canada or Mexico was the host
government. No arbitrations have ever been conducted under the Additional Facility
rules.
179. NAFrA, supranote 2, ch. 20, art. 1120(1). See Report of the Upited Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Ninth Session, 31 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 17, at 34, U.N. Doc. A131/17 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976). Arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, under the current situation, would be mandatory for
arbitrations between Canada and Mexico and optional in cases where the United States
was the host government or a U.S. investor was involved.
180. NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1121(1)-(2).
181. Id ch. 11, art. 1122(1).
182. Id.ch. 11, art. 1123.
183. Id. ch. 11, art. 1124(3). The Secretary-General may use his di!,cretion in making
appointments. However, with respect to the appointment of the presiding arbitrator, he
must choose first from a roster of forty-five qualified individuals agreed upon by the three
NAFTA governments. The Secretary-General may select from ICSID's standing panel of
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Article 1126 addresses the possibility that more than one investor
might submit to arbitration claims arising out of the same event. It
provides for the appointment by the ICSED Secretary-General of a
special three-member tribunal to consider whether such multiple
claims share questions of fact or law in common, in which case that
tribunal may assume jurisdiction over, and decide, all or part of any
such claims."8
E. Arbitral Proceedings
Articles 1127 through 1129 enable a NAFTA government that is
not involved in the arbitration to be apprised of relevant facts and
other information and, if it wishes, to submit views to the tribunal on
questions of NAFTA interpretation. To help ensure the enforceability
of an award, unless otherwise agreed, the arbitration must take place
in a country that is a party to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New
York Convention"). 18
Articles 1131 and 1132 address the substantive law to be applied
in arbitral proceedings. Arbitral tribunals are to decide questions in
accordance with NAFTA and applicable international law.18 6 In addition, NAFrA arbitration tribunals are bound by any interpretation of
the agreement by the Free Trade Commission established under Article 2001. l w
A tribunal may seek advice from experts on environmental,
health, safety, or other scientific matters under certain conditions.1s
In addition, a country cannot assert, as a defense or set-off, that the
investor has been compensated for its losses by insurance or similar
189

means.

Article 1137(2), read together with annex 1137.2, requires each
NAFTA government to designate in its official register the agency to
arbitrators only in the event that no person on the roster is available and may choose only
non-NAFTA nationals.
184. Id ch. 11, art. 1126(2).
185. Id. ch. 11, art. 1130. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-

ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517,330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered
into force for the United States on June 7,1959, and for Canada on August 10, 1986 (implemented through various statutes in all 13 jurisdictions)). Mexico is also party to the New
York Convention.
186.
187.
188.
189.

NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1131(1).
Id ch 11, art. 1131(2).
Id ch. 11, art. 1133.
I& ch. 11, art. 1137(3).
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which notices and other arbitration documents are to be delivered. 19°
For the United States, this will be the Department of State.
F. Nature of Relief
A tribunal may order interim protective measures to preserve existing rights of the disputants, including the preseration of evidence. 191 A tribunal cannot, however, order attachment of assets or
enjoin the government from applying any measure tha: is the subject
of the dispute. 92
NAFTA limits a final award to money damages or restitution, or
a combination of both; awards of restitution must offer the alternative
of paying damages.' 93 No punitive damages may be awarded. 94
G. Enforcement of ArbitralAwards
Article 1136 sets forth rules covering government enforcement of
final awards. In accordance with the traditional rule, an arbitral
award has no precedential effect and is binding only on the particular
disputants in the matter, who are obliged to abide by and comply with
the award.' 95 A disputant does have the opportunity to seek revision
or annulment of the award before enforcement may be sought. 96
Each party must provide for enforcement of an award in its territory.197 In the event that a country does not comply with an award,
the investor's government may request a government-lo-government
arbitration panel to consider the matter. 98 The initiation of such proceedings would not prevent the investor from seeking enforcement of
the award. 99
190. Id. ch. 11, art. 1137(2).
191. Id. ch. 11, art. 1134.
192. Id.
193. Id. ch. 11, art. 1135(1).
194. Id. ch. 11, art. 1135(3).
195. Id. ch. 11, art. 1136(1)-(2).
196. Id. ch. 11, art. 1136(3). No standards are established in chapter 11 for annulment
proceedings; thus, the rules of the relevant arbitral regime will be applicable. Annulment
proceedings are common and may involve allegations that (i) the tribunal was improperly
constituted, (ii) the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, (iii) a panel member was subject to bias or corruption, (iv) the panel engaged in a serious departure from a fundamental
rule of procedure, or (v) the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based.
197. Id. ch. 11, art. 1136(4). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1995),
satisfies the requirement for the enforcement of non-ICSID awards in the United States.
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650,
1650a (1989), provides for the enforcement of ICSID awards.
198. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1136(5)-(6).
199. Id.
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NAFTA allows a disputing investor to seek enforcement of an
award under the ICSIID Convention, the New York Convention, or
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention).2 0 By declaring that claims submitted
to NAFTA arbitration will be considered to arise out of a commercial
relationship or transaction, Article 1136(7) satisfies the prerequisites
of the New York Convention and the Panama Convention for the enforcement of awards.
H.

Publicationof Awards

Regarding the publication of awards, for arbitrations involving
the United States or Canada, either disputant may make the awards
public; for arbitral proceedings involving Mexico, the applicable arbitration rules will govern. 0
IX.

PROVISIONS FOR PRIVATE COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES

NAFTA is the first U.S. trade agreement that deals with the resolution of purely private international commercial disputes. Each
NAFTA party should, to the maximum extent possible, "encourage
and facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of alternative
dispute resolution for the settlement of international commercial disputes between private parties in the free trade area."202 In support of
this effort, an advisory committee will report to the Commission on
03
alternative dispute resolution procedures in the free trade area
Although the agreement does not prescribe or establish particular arbitration procedures, it takes note of the New York Convention and
the Panama Convention, and it can be expected that various outreach
programs will be established to educate businesses in all three countries on the nature and importance of arbitration of private commercial disputes?'
200. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done Jan.

30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 LL.M. 336 (entered into force for the United States, June
16, 1976). Mexico, but not Canada, is party to the Panama Convention.
201. NAFrA, supra note 2, ch. 11, art. 1137(4), annex 1137(4).
202. Id. cl. 20, art. 2022(1).

203. Id. ch. 20, art. 2022(4).
204. Ginger Lew, NAFTA and the Resolution of Private CommercialDisputes, International Law News, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association, 24
AM. BAR ASS'N 1 (1995).
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CONCLUSIONS

Despite an infirm beginning, two constitutional attacks, expressions of judicial concern, 20 5 and the occasional cries of disappointed
litigants, it seems fair to say that the dispute settlement mechanisms
created by the CFTA and expanded in NAFTA are here to stay. As
noted above, most of the initial concerns about the process, particularly the chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism, have been laid to
rest.2° While the ad hoc character of the panel process and its lack of
significant institutional support present a continuing challenge as well
as concern, the panelists have shown exceptional commitment to the
process and have produced opinions which have consistently been
thorough and of very high quality. While this is largely due to their
own efforts, in fairness it must be said that it is also due in significant
part to the efforts of government counsel and of the members of the
trade Bar arguing these cases, who have consistently acted with an
extraordinary level of efficiency, ability, and competence in a highly
complex area of the law.
Over the seven-year period since the CFTA came into force, the
three secretariats have dealt with some seventy cases (cl. 18/20, ch. 19,
and EGG). 2 07 These cases have been, and are continuing to be dealt
with in a manner that is fair, effective, and fully congruent with the
goals of the original CFTA negotiators. In chapter 19 cases, the "temporary" system put in place by the CFTA has become a permanent
205. In a now famous, but clearly good natured, remark, the Honorable Mr. Justice
Willard Z. Estey of Canada said during the Extraordinary Challenge Committee hearing
on Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Porkfrom Canada,ECC-91-1904-01USA, that "[t]hese panels
are pick-up squads who are roving around like a ubiquitous band of Indians." The somewhat turgid review of the panel process by U.S. Circuit Judge (Ret.) Malcolm Wilkey in
Softwood Lumber Productsfrom Canada,ECC-94-1904-01USA, was much less generous
(in effect saying that foreigners cannot be expected to understand or correctly apply U.S.

law).
206. Gary Horlick and Amanda F. DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Panels of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement" The First Two and One-Half Years, 37 McGi.L L. J. 575-96
(1992); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, BinationalPanelDispute Settlement Und r Chapters18 and
19 of the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade agreement: An Interim Appraisal,24 N.Y.U. J.
INr'L L. & POL. (1991); Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter19 of the NAFTA: BinationalPanels
as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INr'L LAW. 707 (1993).
207. It may be noted, in contrast, that in the forty-seven year history of GATl'jurisprudence, the total number of cases is approximately 200, which figure was characterized by
Professor John H. Jackson as "the largest significant body of case-law experience developed for a model multilateral treaty of broad purpose and application." Professor John H.

Jackson, The Uruguay Round: Appraisal and Implications for International Trade and Investment (paper presented at the Tokyo Conference on Apr. 20-21, 1992). Clearly,
NAFTA will generate cases at a much faster rate and thus will become an important crucible for the examination and resolution of international trade disputes.
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fixture in NAFA.20° The structure of chapters 18 and 20 has been
improved significantly with the adoption of NAFTA and has even
proved to have favorably influenced the WTO dispute resolution
sys9
tem, which was recently finalized in the Uruguay Round.
In the immediate future, the principal challenge for NAFTA's
dispute settlement mechanisms will be to deal effectively with the new
Mexican cases. These cases arise in a jurisdiction which is grounded in
the civil law and one in which so-called "trade law" is still in its infancy. The commonalities and mutual understanding that served the
process so well in the Canada-U.S. context do not have an analogue in
the Mexican context, despite the attempts of Mexico to formally harmonize its trade law with that of its northern neighbors. The practical
difficulties of conducting a proceeding in two languages will also place
new burdens on the secretariats.
Nevertheless, in the opinion of this frequent panelist, 10 these
challenges will also be successfully dealt with and NAFTA's dispute
resolution mechanisms will continue to prove to be a viable framework for trade integration and peaceful trade relations among all
NAFTA countries.
208. Whether the AD and CVD laws themselves prove to be "permanent" is another
question. It has been widely noted that the problems of AD and CVD enforcement as a
source of trade disputes would disappear if the countries involved shifted their investigations away from AD and CVD enforcement to a system of domestic competition or antitrust-type enforcement. While many regard this approach as an inevitable adjunct to
ongoing multilateral and regional trade liberalization, the time frame in which it could
actually occur remains problematic.
209. See Statement of Administrative Action, at 345, reprintedin URUGuAY ROUND
TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMET, IPI.MENTmNG Bui, STATEMENT OF AD.
IM.STRATrvE AcrnoN, AND REQUIRED SuppoRTw STATEmNS, H.R. Doc. No. 316,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, at 1014 (1994) (noting that article 15 of the DSU creates a new
procedure based in part on Ch. 18/20, providing that the panel must furnish the parties
with a complete draft of the panel's report-including the panel's findings and conclusions-before it is made final).
210. The author has served on five chapter 19 panels, two of which are ongoing at this
writing. These cases include: Cut-to-Length Plate Productsfrom the United States, MEX94-1904-02; Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Productsfrom Canada,Panel No.
USA-93-1904-03, 1995 FTAPD LEXIS 10 (May 1, 1995), availablein LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File; Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Platefrom Canada,Panel No.
USA-93-1904-04, 1995 FTAPD LEXIS 9 (May 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFIA File; Softwood Lumber from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-02, 1995
FTAPD LEXIS 3 (Jan. 27,1995), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, USCFTA File; and
Replacement Partsfor Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada,Panel
No. USA-90-1904-01, 1992 FTAPD LEXIS 7 (Oct. 28, 1992), availablein LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, USCFTA File.
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Deadline

Total Time
(months)

60 days

2

25-60 days

3-4

30 days

4-5

6-9 months

10-14

60 days

12-16

60-90 days

14-19

30 days

15-20

"Reasonable
time"

Request for retaliationI

20 days

Retaliation authorized

30 days

Final arbitration

60 days

Figure 1. Dispute settlement procedures and deadlines
under the WTO
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Deadline

15 Days or
Reasonable Time
15-45 Days

10 Days

30 Days

30-40 Days

90 Days

30 Days

Reasonable time

15 Days

30 Days

60 Days

Figure 2. Dispute settlement procedures and deadlines
under the NAFTA Ch. 20

